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Probably no function of a municipal corporation is more "govern-
mental" in character than the care of its highways, streets and bridges.
In theory, therefore, the city should be immune from responsibility for
negligence in such matters; and such was the common law. Precisely
the opposite result, however, constitutes the weight of judicial authority
in this country, even in the absence of statute, on the commonly
advanced ground that the duty of taking care of the public highways
is ministerial in character.2 3 0  The conclusion deserves approval, though
not necessarily the ground on which it is based. More difficult to
support is the common-law immunity extended to towns and counties
in several parts of the country in respect of like defects in public high-
ways. Mention has already been made of the way in which the courts,
first in New England,251 worked out the immunity of the county, on the
authority of Russell v. Men of Devon.25 2 Most of these cases involved
actions for injuries arising out of defective highways or bridges.
These early cases have been followed very generally in New England
* Continued from the December number, 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 129-143.
'*Sherwin v. Aurora (1913) 257 Ill. 458, IOO N. E. 938, 42 L. R. A. (N. s.)
ii6 and note; Cleveland v. King (i889) 132 U. S. 295, 10 Sup. Ct. 90; cases
cited in 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 1687 and 13 P. C. L. 310, note ig. See criticism in
Lane v. Minn. State Agricultural Soc. (1895) 62 Minn. i75, 64 N. W. 382, 29
L. R. A. 708; White, Negligence of Municipal Corporations (192o) secs. 195
et seq.
" Mower v. Leicester (1812) 9 Mass. 247. Of course the state is immune from
suit. See Wilmington v. Ewing (IOI) 2 Penn. (Del.) 66, 43 Atl. 305, 45 L. R. A.
79.
(788, K. B.) 2 T. R. 667, ioo Eng. Rep. 359.
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and a few other states,253 so that we must accept the distinction which
enables the pedestrian who falls into a hole located on the city line
to recover damages if he fell in on the city side,2 54 but deny him relief
if he fell in on the county side.255  So artificial is this distinction
that several courts have rejected it, some holding the city as immune
as -the county,256 others holding the county as liable as the city.
2 57
Judge Dillon conservatively expresses the view that the ground for
the distinction "is not as satisfactory to the mind as could be desired."
258
After seeking plausibly to justify the distinction on the ground'that
the duty of maintaining the public highways is a special one with a
local aspect, that the highways are under the direct and exclusive con-
trol of the municipal authorities, whose duty in respect. of repairs is
intrinsically ministerial and that they have ample means to perform
the duty properly, he admits that the doctrine of municipal responsi-
bility, vigorously combated by justice Gray in Hill v. Boston,=5 is
anomalous. Nevertheless, Judge Dillon gropes for an explanation of
the anomaly and suggests that it may be found in the fact that law
and logic "are not always precisely coincident or coterminous" and
that distinctions "are oftentimes easier to feel than to unfold and
define," and do not always obviously "consist with an indefinite exten-
sion and inexorable application of those principles of logic that are
apparently applicable to and seemingly control the subject."2 60  It is
believed that the alleged distinction rests upon a fundamental lack of
principle, and that the historical origin of the county and the inher-
ently governmental nature of the duty of keeping the public highways
in repair probably account for the fact that the exception to the rule
of immunity made in the case of city streets and highways was not
Z'4 Dillon. op. cit., sec. 1688. and cases cited in 13 I. C. L. 306-3o7, notes 2
and 3.
2"Fleming v. City of Memphis (1912) 126 Tenn. 331, 148 S. W. 1057.
.. Wood v. Tipton County (1874, Tenn.) 7 Baxt. 112.
' Young v. Charleston (188o) 20 S. C. i6; Pray v. fersey City (1868) 32
N. J. L. 394; Arkadelphia v. Windham (1886) 49 Ark. 139, 4 S. W. 45o; Detroit
v. Blackeby (870) 21 Mich. 84. See 13 R. C. L. 3o9, note 16.
"House v. Montgomnerv County (1878) 6o Ind. 580; Dean v. New Milford
Township (1843, Pa.) 5 W. & S. 545; Anne Arundel County Comm'rs v. Duckett
(1863) 2o Md. 468. In Indiana and Iowa the liability is confined to public bridges.
See also McCalla v. Multno-nud County (1869) 3 Ore. 424; Jones, Negligence of
Municipal Corporations (1892) sec. 65; and 13 R. C. L. 3o7, notes 4 and 5.
= 4 Dillon, op. cit., p. 2953. He adds, p. 2954: "It must be confessed that where
the duty to repair is expressly enjoined by statute, but no action is expressly given,
it is not easy to set forth clear grounds for the distinction as to the liability of
cities and counties in respect of the duty to keep the streets and highways under
their several jurisdictions in repair." See also Jones, Negligence of Municipal
Corporations (1892) secs. 67-69, and 2 A. L. R. 724.
'" Hill v. Boston (1877) 122 Mass. 344. Justice Gray admitted that the positive
act of the city authorities directing an obstruction would impose liability.
20 4 Dillon, op. cit., secs. 1713-1716.
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extended to counties, although they have in every -respect the same
relation to the duty involved as a city. It would also have been better
and more logical had the reasoning by which the courts worked out
municipal responsibility for negligence in the care of streets been
extended to other municipal duties equally governmental in character;
but while this has been done by many courts in some aspects of the
installation and operation of public improvements, such as, sewers, the
doctrine has not beedi extended on any basis of logic, so that we are
still left in confusion and convinced of the absence of underlying prin-
ciple. Our sole reliance appears to be the particular view of classifi-
cation or policy adopted by the courts in the particular jurisdiction
in which a case arises.
In respect of the liability of cities and counties in the care of streets
and highways, statutes have to some extent ameliorated the confusion
by expressly imposing liability for defective highways upon city and
county alike, 281 ihough the liability is usually conditioned upon such
requirements as notice, clear proof of municipal negligence or positive
misfeasance, absence of contributory negligence, liability to travelers
only, and other conditions. Occasionally, the statutes deny or qualify
a liability which the courts have imposed in earlier cases.
The defect or negligence imposing liability may be due to a
variety of causes, for example, the absence of railings at points in
the road where reasonable care requires them ;262 obstructions on streets
and sidewalks caused by snow and ice, provided the city had sufficient
time after notice, actual or constructive, to remedy the defective con-
dition and had failed to do so.2 03 State courts differ greatly in their
Udkin v. New Haven (19o7) 8o Conn. 291, 68 Atl. 253, 14 L R. A. (w. s.)868; 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 1691 and notes; and 13 R. C. L. 3o8, notes io and ii.It is hardly feasible to examine in detail the limitations and conditions of municipalliability established by the construction of these statutes. Some statutes also
contain special exemptions from or qualifications on liability. See Schigley v.Waseca (19o8) io6 Minn. 94, i18 N. W. 259, 19 L. R_ A. (N. s.) 689; also 42L. R. A. (N. s.) 493; 13 R. C. L. sec. 261; 2 A. L. R. 723; and White, op. cit.,
secs. 200 et seq.
"Palner v. Andover (1864, Mass.) 2 Cuph. 6oo; Mayor .... of Baltimore v.State (1924, Md.) *126 Atl. 130; 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 1696. So with respect to
unguarded manholes or excavations, where negligence can be imputed to the city.Mackey v. Vicksburg (1887) 64 Miss. 777, 2 So. 178. Dami Spedding v. Montreal(915, Que.) 47 Sup'r Ct. 493. But of course, unless a nuisance Per se, statutory
conditions as to notice must be complied with. Ziegler v. City of West Bend(i8gg) io2 Wis. 17, 78 N. W. 164. As to the distinctions between nuisance and
negligence, as applied particularly in the New York cases, see comment on Heller
v. Smith (1922, Iowa) 188 N. W. 878, in (1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 56; and White,OP. cit., secs. 343-349. 5
2 Williams V. City of New York (1915) 214 N. Y. 259, io8 N. E. 448. Theduty with respect to crosswalks seems in New York somewhat less onerous.Du Pont v. Village of Port Chester (1912) 204 N. Y. 351, 97 N. E. 735; (1915)
I CoRN. L. QUART. 53; (1921) 21 CoL. L. REv. 824; 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 1697.6 McQuillin, op. cit. sec. 277o, 2789, 2794. White, op. cit. secs. 500 et seq.
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criteria of negligence. For defectiire lighting of streets constituting
a proximate cause of injury, cities have been held liaBle, but only, it
seems, where the duty of lighting at all has been assumed by the city.
264
For negligently leaving objects or obstructions in the street, calculated
to frighten animals, thereby causing injurious accidents, liability has
been imposed, on the theory that they constitute public nuisances in
streets which the city was under a duty to keep in a safe condition ;265 a
similar rule applies to injuries sustained by travellers or pedestrians
from falling trees or limbs, ice from roofs, dangerous cornices, bill-
boards, awnings, etc., provided the city can be charged with negli-
gence.26 6  With respect to injuries caused by fireworks 'displays, horse
or automobile races, merry-go-rounds, and similar obstructions in the
public-streets, there appears to be much confusion. When carried on
without license or authority from the city, immunity is placed on the
ground of want of negligence ;267 but where a license or permit has been
granted, immunity is by some courts placed on the ground that public
celebrations or fairs, in which these injuries frequently occur, are gov-
ernmental in character, or are not inherently dangerous, or, like coast-
ing, not being inherently a nuisance, permission to coast came within
the .city's legislative discretion, or even, in one case, that permission
of illegal horse-racing is wholly ultra vires.261  On the other hand,
probably the majority of courts find in the license or permit the opera-
' Randall v. Eastern R. R. (1871) io6 Mass. 276; Butler v. Bangor (1877) 67
Me. 385. Cases cited in 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 170, note 3. 6 McQuillin, op. cit.
sec. 28o6.
" Chicago v. Hoy (874) 75 Ill. 530. See cases cited in 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec.
17o2, notes 2 and 3. 6 McQuillin, op. cit. secs. 2767-2769, 2783. On the distinction
between nuisance and negligence, see (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 56; White, op. cit.,
secs. 365 et seq.
Grove v. Fort Wayne (1874) 45 Ind. 429; Drake v. Lowell (1847 Mass.) 13
Metc. 292; but see Hixon v. Lowell (1859 Mass.) 13 Gray 59. See Dahmer v.
City of Meridian (1916) rii Miss. 208, 71 So. 321; Dyer v. Danbury (1911) 85
Conn. 128, 81 Atl. 958; 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 1705; 6 McQuillin, op. cit. sec. 2775
et seq.; White, op. cit., secs. 39o et seq. and cases there cited. The decisions are
by no means uniform, and occasionally make artificial distinctions difficult to
support. See cases in (1912) 25 HARV. L. Rxv. 646, note 14.
Ball v. Woodbine (1884) 61 Iowa, 83, 15 N. W. 846.
1 Tindley v. Salem (1884) 137 Mass. I71; Wheeler v. Plymouth (1888) 116
Ind. 158, i8 N. E. 532; Burford v. Grand Rapids (1884) 53 Mich. 98, i8 N. W.
572; Marth v. Kingfisher (19o8) 22 Okla. 6o2, 98 Pac. 436. These cases are all
cited in 4 Dillon, op. cit. 2980. See also Pope v. New Haven (1917). 91 Conn. 79,
99 At. 51, L. R. A. 1917 D 1285 (fireworks display); and Rose v. Gypsum City
(1919) 104 Kan. 412, 279 Pac. 348; (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 117. See the
learned dissenting opinion of Wheeler, J in Pope v. New Haven, supra. He
would have imposed liability on the ground that the explosion of defective fire-
works used by the city established a nuisance, and was not merely the negligent
performance of a "governmental" function. There is less responsibility, apparently,
in controlling moving objects or persons than in controlling those that are sta-
tionary.
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tive fact predicating liability, on the ground that the city has thereby
authorized a nuisance on or illegal use of its streets.269  With respect
to coasting, confusion also prevails.27 ' Non-liability may be said to
constitute the weight of authority, though the theories advanced, e. g.
that the duty to prevent coasting relates to the execution of state law,
or is public or police in character and not corporate, or that the enforce-
ment of ordinances is discretionary or governmental or that coasting is'
not a defect or a nuisance, even where expressly permitted, indicates
the absence of underlying principle.
Bridges
The liability of cities for injuries arising out of defective bridges or
the negligence of tenders of drawbridges follows to some extent, though
not uniformly, the rules adopted by the particular jurisdiction with
respect to highways. Common-law immunity with respect to defective
highways will usually be found, in the absence of statute, to extend to
bridges, both as to vessels and to travellers upon the bridge . 2 7  Yet
it would be unsafe to rely upon such uniformity, for in fact great
confusion prevails. Where the city is held not liable the court will
glibly advance the ritual that the duty to maintain bridges is performed
in its governmental capacity for the public good, and that the city derives
no benefit therefrom ;272 yet where the city is held liable, even in the
Van Cleef v. Chicago (1909) 240 IIl. 318, 88 N. E. 815 (fair and exhibition
in street); Speir v. Brooklyn (1893) 139 N. Y. 6, 34 N. E. 727 (display of fire-
works); Heller v. Smith (1922, Iowa) I88 N. W. 878, and note in (1923) 23
COL. L. REv. 56; Johnson v. New York (19o6) 186 N. Y. 139, 78 N. E. 7,5,(automobile speed contest) ; Malchow v. City of Leoti (1915) 95 Kan. 787, 149
Pac. 687; (1915) 43 WASH. L. REP. 62o; L. R. A. 1915 F 568 and note (merry-
go-round, etc.) ; White, op. cit., secs. 1x6, 131. See also 13 R. C. L. 303, 304. In
Shinnick v. Marshalltown (29O8)'I37 Iowa, 72, 114 N. W. 542, the injury for
which the city was held liable was caused by a rope stretched across the street by
a policeman in order to stop traffic.
' Yet where the state or its agencies, like a state board of agriculture, licenses a
nuisance of this kind, e. g., an aeroplane injuring a spectator at a state fair, some
courts learnedly argue that the function of holding fairs and affording amusement
there is "governmental" in character-though in speaking of a state activity, it
seems unnecessary to make distinctions between governmental and corporate
functions-and the injured individual is therefore without redress. See Morrison
v. McLaren (1915) i6o Wis. 621, 252 N. W. 475, and supra.
" Imposing liability, Taylor v. Cumberland (1885) 64 Md. 68, 2o Atl. IO27;
denying liability, Dudley v. Flemingsburg (I9O3) 115 Ky. 5, 72 S. W. 327. See
notes of cases in 23 L. R. A. (x. s.) 639; 13 R. C. L. 302; White, op. cit. sec.
135; and 6 McQuillin, op. cit. sec. 2771.
... Immunity, Evans v. Sheboygan (19,3) 153 Wis. 287, 141 N. W. 265; Daly v-
New Haven (1897) 69 Conn. 644, 38 Atl. 397; Liability, Gathman v. Chicaga(igo8) 236 Il1. 9, 86 N. E. 152, 1g L. R A. (N. s.) Mi78 and note. See 4 R. C. L.
231 et seq.; 6 McQuillin. op. cit. sec. 2749; and White, op. cit. secs. 4o5 et seq.
"' See Daly v. New Haven, Evans v. Sheboygan, stpra, note 271, and Corning v.
Saginaw (1898) 116 Mich. 74, 74 N. W. 307.
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absence of statute, the courts have said that the duty is corporate and
ministerial and performed in its private capacity. 73  In Wisconsin, a
curious result has been reached, namely, that as to navigators on the
river, the duty of maintaining bridges is corporate and imposes liability
f or negligence, 274 whereas the duty as to travelers over the bridge as
a highway is governmental and the city is not liable for negligence.
Probably nothing better illustrates the want of principle governing the
subject.
Public Improvements
The conflict of authority as to the liability of municipal corporations
for negligence in the maintenance of streets is reflected in the law
governing the liability of the city for the tortious acts of persons in
its employ engaged in constructing or repairing the public streets.
Immunity or liability in these matters depends upon the view of the
particular courts as to whether the duty is governmental or corporate,
and in this respect there is the usual wide divergence, depending often
upon the particular line on which the courts in that jurisdiction got
started. There is no discoverable operative principle.275  The same
confusion prevails as to street cleaning, a question further complicated
by the fact that courts disagree in their view as to whether clearing
the streets of dirt and refuse pertains primarily to the corporate duty
of taking care of the streets or the governmental duty of preserving
the public healthY.2 7
' Lehigh Valley Transportation Co. v. Chicago (i9o9) 237 Ill. 581, 86 N. E.
w093; Naumburg v. City of Milwaukee (x9o6, 7th) 77 C. C. A. 67, 146 Fed. 641.
' Weisenberg v. Winneconne (1883) 56 Wis. 667, 14 N. W. 871. Naumburg v.
City of Milwaukee, supra note 273. In Evans v. Sheboygan, supra note 272, where
the city was held not liable to a traveller on the bridge, the court offers a shallow
explanation for distinguishing the earlier cases of Weisenberg and Naumburg:
"We think there is reason for saying that, as to a person navigating a river, a
municipality is performing a corporate duty or, if not, that it cannot escape
liability for negligence of its employees by asserting that it is performing a govern-
mental duty." We have seen, supra note 257, that among the few states holding
counties liable, like cities, for negligent defects in highways, Indiana and Iowa
confined the liability to bridges. Indiana, however, overruled its earlier decisions
in Commissioners of Jasper County v. Allman (18o5) 142 Ind. 573, 42 N. E. 206,
39 L. R. A. 58 and note, and now follows in this respect the prevailing rule of
county immunity.
"'The opposing views are well represented by the two cases of McManus v.
Weston (1895) 164 Mass. 263, 41 N. E. 3o1, holding the city immune for negli-
gence of road commissioners, and Barree v. Cape Girardeau (i9o6) 197 Mo. 382,
95 S. W. 33o, 6 L. R. A. (N. s.) io9o and note, holding the city liable for an
assault on a motorman by a city street commissioner engaged in repairing a street.
See also Kriebel v. Worcester Township (I916) 253 Pa. 452, 98 At. 686. See the
lists of cases on the opposite sides of this question in 29 R. C. L. 2227, notes ii
and 12, and note to Jones, Adm. v. Richmond (1916) 118 Va. 612, 88 S. E. 82,
(I916) 2 VA. L. REG. (N. s.) 36.
' To the effect that the duty of removing refuse, flushing the streets and other-
wise cleaning them is governmental, either as caring for the streets or caring for
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In the construction and maintenance-of public works or improve-
ments, such as sewers, drains, etc., we find a greater disposition to hold
the city liable for negligence.2 7 7  The explanation of this disposition
can hardly be found in the usually ascribed reason that such under-
takings are not governmental, but ministerial in character; it is found
rather in the fact that when a public enterprise creates a direct nuisance
to private property, the governmental nature of the undertaking seems,
in the minds of the courts, to become subordinate or immaterial. 27 8  Cer-
tainly there is nothing less governmental in providing the city with
sewers than in providing it with schools and fire protection, and the
courts often find themselves involved in the problem of determining
whether sewers and drains do not partake of means to safeguard the
public health, usually regarded as a governmental function . 2 7  The
fact that the courts appear to find different principles involved when
public health, see Savannah v. Jordan (1914) 142 Ga. 4o9, 83 S. E. iog; Kippes v.
Louisville (1io) 74o Ky. 423, 131 S. W. 184, 3o L. R. A. (N. s.) 1x61; Bruhnke
v. La Crosse (1914) 155 Wis. 485, 144 N. W. ioo; Cassidy v. St. Joseph (1912)
247 Mo. 197, 152 S. W. 3o6, and infra, note 321. To the effect that it involves the
corporate duty of caring for the streets, see Denver v. Maurer (1Io) 47 Colo.
2o9, iO6 Pac. 875; Missano v. New York (I8g) i6o N. Y. 123, 54 N. E. 744;
Ostrom v. San Antonio (1goi) 94 Tex. 523, 62 S. W. 9o9. See note in L. R. A.
1915 C 741 and (914) 79 CENTRA. L. JouR. 385.
Sprinkling or flushing the street has more often been held to be governmental as
incidental to the preservation of the public health than corporate. Held govern-
mental, in Harris v. District of Columbia (ip2i) 256 U. S. 65o, 41 Sup. Ct. 6Io;
Louisville v. Carter (I9I1) 142 Ky. 443, 134 S. W. 468; Conelly v. Nashville
(1898) ioo Tenn. 262, 46 S. W. 565. Held corporate, in Denver v. Maurer
(i9io) supra.
' City of Montgomery vz. Stephens (1915) 14 Ala. App. 274, 69 So. 97o, (I916)
14 MrcH. L. R.V. 352; Haynes v. Burlington (1865) 38 Vt. 350; Macon v.
Dannenberg (spoi) 113 Ga. siin (obstructed culvert). See (1923) i1 CAIF. L.
REv. 444; 4 Dillon, op. cit. secs. I731 et seq. and 1741 et seq.; and White, op. cit.
secs. 140 et seq.
'Ashley v. Port Huron (1877) 35 Mich. 296. Schwalk's Administrator v.
City of Louisville (I9o9) 135 Ky. 570, 122 S. W. 86o. Seifert v. Brooklyn
(1886) IoI N. Y. 136, 4 N. E. 321. Even the question of negligence becomes
secondary when an injury to property is involved. There is still a great conflict
among the courts, even as to sewers, some courts finding the function corporate,
Murphy v. Indianapolis (1902) 158 Ind. 238, 63 N. E. 469; Ostrander v. City of
Lansing (1897) iir Mich. 693, 4o N. W. 332; others regarding it as governmental,
Taggart v. Fall River (1898) 170 Mass. 325, 49 N. E. 622.
It must be admitted that practically all the cases holding the city immune from
responsibility on the ground that sewerage is incidental to the preservation of the
public health involve actions for personal injury only. Hughes v. Auburn (1899)
161 N. Y. 96, 55 N. E. 389; Smith v. Commissioners of Sewerage of Louisville
(92) 146 Ky. 562, 143 S. W. 3. The courts occasionally find themselves in
doubt, where defective sewerage is connected with a schobl building, whether the
liability for defective sewerage or the immunity in conducting a school shall
prevail. Cf. Watson v. New Milford (19oo) 72 Conn. 561, 45 AUt. 167 (city
liable) and Folk v. Milwaukee (ipoo) io8 Wis. 362, 84 N. W. 42o (city not
liable).
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an injury to private property is negligently caused, is illustrated by the
fact that when the negligent maintenance of the sewer system causes
merely sickness to the person without involving trespass upon property,
the courts fall back upon the formula that in the construction and main-
tenance of a sewer system, so far as concerns the community at large,
the city is performing a governmental function and in the absence of
an invasion or violation of a property or contract right of the plaintiff
no recovery is. possible. 280
It has already been observed that the same common-law nuisance,
such as the maintenance of a city dump, will produce liability for injury
to the property of an adjoining owner, but not for a personal injury.281
For a long time the courts seemed to be fairly well agreed that when the
city failed to provide drainage or when the injury was the result of a
defective or inefficient plan, no liability could be imposed, for the duty,
if any, in this respect, was judicial or legislative--they were not sure
which-in its nature .2 12  It is of course discretionary, and that is doubt-
less what is meant. But more recent cases take what is probably a
' Hughes v. Auburn (i899) i6I N. Y. 96, 55 N. E. 389, where O'Brien, J. said:
"In the construction and maintenance of a sewer or drainage system a municipal
corporation exercises a part of the governmental powers of the State for the
customary local convenience and benefit of all the people, and in the exercise of
these discretionary functions the municipality cannot be required to respond in
damages to individuals for injury to health, resulting either from omissions" to act
or the mode of exercising the power conferred on it, for public purposes to be
used at discretion for the public good." But see Willett v. St. Albans (i897) 69
Vt. 330, 38 Atl. 72. Hughes.v. Auburn has been followed in several cases, cf.
Williams v. Greenville (902) 13o N. C. 93, 40 S. E. 977, and probably represents
the weight of authority. It seems strange that all these allegedly valid reasons
for denying recovery for personal injuries due to negligence in the management
of sewers should become immaterial when the same negligence results in an injury
to property. Cf. Hollenbeck v. Marion (1902) II6 Iowa 69, 89 N. W. 210.
Indeed, -in such cases the courts rationalize differently and customarily reach the
conclusion that the function is corporate the duty ministerial, and the city therefore
liable. See the case of Platt Bros. v. City of Waterbury (igoo) 72 Conn. 531. 45
Atl. 154, and the exhaustive notes in 48 L. R. A. 691 and 6I L. R. A. 673, at p. 713.
See 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 1744, citing Loughran v. Des Moines (1887) 72 Iowa
382, 34 N. W. 172, and Allen v. Boston (1893) 159 Mass. 324, 34 N. E. 529, where
damages for sickness caused by sewer nuisance were allowed, but where this was
incidental to a trespass on plaintiff's property. See 6 McQuillin, op. cit. secs. 2698,
2699.
-" Louisville v. Hehentann (914) i6i Ky. 523, 171 S. W. i65, note in L. R. A.
1915 C-747; Hines v. Rocky Mount (2913) 162 N. C. 409, 78 S. E. 510. See also
note to Denver v. Davis (I9O6) 37 Colo. 370, 86 Pac. io27, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1023
and note in 43 L. M A. (N. s.) 1037.
'" Child v. City of Boston (2862, Mass.) 4 Allen 42, 52; Mills v. Brooklyn
(1865) 32 N. Y. 489; Johnston v. District of Cohnnbia (i885) 118 U. S. I9. 6
Sup. Ct. 923; Knostinan & P. F. Co. v. Davenport (1896) 99 Iowa 589, 68 N. W.
887; Hart v. Neillsville (905) 125 Wis. 546, IO4 N. W. 699, 1 L. R. A. (N. s.)
952; Hesketh v. Birmingham Corporation (C. A.) [29241 1 K. B. 26o and 88 J. P.
333. See 9 R. C. L. 662 and cases cited note 20; 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 2739; 61
L. R. A. 687-688; 6 McQuillin, op. cit. secs. 2691, 2693; White, op. cit. secs. 26, 40.
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better view, namely, that when a sewer or culvert, though properly
built, but according to a defective plan, causes a direct invasion of pri-
vate property, for example, by throwing water or sewage upon it
through insufficiency of flow or drainage for normal requirements, the
city is liable, though in fact the city's negligence, if any, is due to a
defective plan.28
3
As a matter of fact, as Dillon properly says, "it is, perhaps, impos-
sible to reconcile all of the cases on this subject," for some courts
emphasize the defectiveness or inefficiency of the plan or the insuffi-
ciency ori incapacity of a sewer,, gutter or drain as a ground for immu-
nity, others emphasize the injury to the realty of a private owner,
regardless of cause, as a ground of liability.28 ' The better principle
would seem to be with the latter courts. Indeed, many courts seek to
find a line of distinction between the legislative or judicial duties with
respect to sewers and those that are ministerial, holding the city liable
on the ministerial ground for negligence in construction and operation
or failure to repair. As may well be imagined there is no little dis-
agreement in the judicial effort to establish the line of demarcation
between the two types of duty.285  It is in these cases assumed that the
city had authority to construct or maintain the public work in question.
The city would have been more certain of immunity had it undertaken
not to provide any sewerage at all, an argument once used quite effect-
ively to justify immunity on account of inadequacy of the sewer or
drain actually constructed. 2 8  With respect to surface-water, there is
'Arndt v. Cullnan (igoi) 132 Ala. 54o, 31 So. 478; Bowman v. Town of
Chenango (192o) 227 N. Y. 459, 125 N. E. S09; (2920) 2o CoL. L. REv. 619; 9
R. C. L. 665, note 17. Some of the earlier cases reached the same result on the
theory that the injury was inflicted pursuant to a corporate act and involved an
injury to realty. Ashley v. Port Huron (1877) 35 Mich. 296; Miles v. Worcester
(89) 254 Mass. 511, 28 N. E. 676; Seifert v. Brooklyn (1886) ioi N. Y. 136,
4 N. E. 321. This would seem to be rationalizing. The cases occasionally go on
the ground that damage to private property is in excess of the city's or board's
authority, and therefore hold it liable, not inunune. Nevins v. Fitchburg (1899)
x74 Mass. 545, 55 N. E. 321; Uppington v. New York (igoi) 165 N. Y. 222, 59
N. E. 91, 53 L. R. A. 550. See 6 McQuillin, op. cit. sec. 2693, 2694, 2699; and
White, op. cit. sec. 162. See the English cases of Hawthorn Corporation v.
Kannuluik (P. C.) [1o6] A. C. IO5 and Attorney Gen. v. Lewes Corp. [I922] 2
Ch. 495; and article in (913) 77 JusT. P 110, where the English cases are
discussed.
'Lehn v. San Francisco (1868) 66 Calif. 76, 4 Pac. 965; Taylor v. Austin
(1&94) 32 Minn. 247, 2o N. W. 157. See 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 274o; 6 McQuillin,
op. cit. sec. 2694; and the cases there cited.
"Barton v. Syracuse (1867) 36 N. Y. 54; King v. Kansas City (1897) 58 Kan.
334, 49 Pac. 88; Kobs v. Minneapolis (875) 22 Minn. i59; Seymour v. Cummins
(i889) 11 Ind. 148, 21 N. E. 549. See 4 Dillon, op. cit. secs. I741-1743; (I916)
14 Mica. L. REV. 353; 1 R. C. L. 670-672; 6 McQuillin. op. cit. sec. 2695.
'Mills v. Brooklyn (1865) 32 N. Y. 489; Gulath v. St. Louis (1903) 179 Mo.
38, 77 S. W. 744; Judge v. Meriden (1871) 38 Conn. go. See 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec.
1739; 6 McQuillin, op. cit sec. 2691; Thompson, Negligence, sec. 5871.
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less disposition to hold the city liable, partly on the often asserted
ground that damages from diverted surface-water are consequential in
character, partly on the ground that surface-water is a common enemy
which each owner may repel and against which each owner must guard
himself, partly on the ground that omission to provide any or adequate
drains is an exercise of legislative or discretionary power for which
there is no liability.28 7
Perhaps none of these explanations is altogether satisfactory, but as in
the case of incidental injuries to private property due to a change in
street grade,281 they may usually be regarded as too slight in degree to
justify compensation from the public treasury. In fact, it is probably
the constitutional provision regarding compensation for taking or, in
most states, for damage to private property for the public use which
explains the readiness of courts, even in the absence of statute, to find in
an invasion of rights of private property a ground for municipal liability,
regardless of whether the function involved is what they profess to
regard as "governmental" or "corporate," and the apparent inability
to find a similar ground of liability where merely personal injury is
involved. Though it is not seemingly apparent to Judge Dillon, the
justification he advances for municipal liability to property owners for
injuries arising out of defective sewers, applies equally, it is believed,
to every form of municipal enterprise producing a direct and serious
injury to the citizen, whether in person or property. The apparent
readiness to regard the city as a public service corporation in the main-
tenance and operation of its streets, sewers and public works is not
less justified in respect of the maintenance of its police, fire and health
services. Dillon says, with sewerage and drainage in mind:
"' See Lord Tenterden in Rex v. Pagham Sewer Commissioners (1828) 8 B. & C.
355, 360; Wilson v. New York (1845, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) i Denio 595, 598; Field v.
West Orange (1882) 36 N.J. Eq. 118; Valparaiso v. Hagen (1899) 153 Ind. 337,
54 N. E. io62 See 4 Dillon, op. cit. secs. 1732-1734. 6 McQuillin, op. cit. sec.
27oo; White, op. cit., secs. 179, 182.
2a4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 1676 et seq. So there is no liability at common law and
by the weight of authority now for the removal of lateral support by the city.
Rome v. Omberg (x859) 28 Ga. 46, an exception to the general rule of private law
on lateral support. A small minority hold the city liable on common law grounds,
e. g. Dyer v. St. Paul (1881) 27 Minm 457, 8 N. W. 272, or where the grading
is done without lawful authority, Meinzer v. Racine (1887) 68 Wis. 241, 32 N. W.
139, or negligently, Harper v. Lenoir (191o) 152 N. C. 723, 68 S. E. 228. Most
courts refuse to consider the incidental injury to private property by street grading
a "taking" under constitutional provisions for compensation, but many states
which provide constitutionally for compensation for "damaging" private property
permit recovery in these cases. See Rutherford v. Williamson (1912) 70 W. Va.
4o2, 74 S. E. 682. Other states have special statutes providing for compensation.
The modern tendency, therefore, as evidenced by constitutions and statutes is to
hold the city liable even for the incidental injury, due to a change of grade in
public streets, provided it is tangible. See the comment in (1918) 2 MIN. L.
REV. 2 6.
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"The city as the corporate representative of the fasciculus of local
interests which make sewersa necessity for the benefit of all the inhabi-
tants of the municipality, is the author of the injury which the plaintiff
in the cases supposed sustains in the attempt to benefit all. The dictate
of justice is that no person should suffer unequally, and, if he does, that
all should make compensation. 2 9
Parks and Playgrounds
Though public parks and playgrounds are public, usually municipal,
property, the greatest doubt prevails as to whether such public property,
held for purposes of amusement, recreation, public health and general
welfare, is held in the city's governmental or corporate capacity. The
varying answer to this question -explains the conflict in the courts
between municipal immunity and municipal liability in respect of
injuries sustained through the negligent management of parks and play-
grounds or instrumentalities connected with them. The one line of
decision, favoring immunity, finds no difficulty in justifying its position
on the ground that in conducting parks and playgrounds the city is act-
ing in a governmental capacity for the general public, not merely for
its own inhabitants, that it derives no pecuniary profit therefrom, or
that it is sustained by general taxation for the preservation of the public
health of the community.20 The other line of decisions holds the city
liable for injuries thus sustained on the ground that its parks are the
corporate, analogous to the private, property, of the city, for the safe
condition and proper management of which it is liable like any private
proprietor .2 1  In several of these cases of the latter group, liability
for injuries occurring on walks in parks is derived from the analogy of
the city's duty to take proper care of its streets and highways ;292 in
2N4 Dillon, op. cit. p. 3o62.
'Blair v. Granger (I9O2) 24 R! I. i7, 51 Atl. io42; Park Commissioners v.
Prins (1907) 127 Ky. 460, 105 S. W. 948; Clark v. Waltham (i8go) 128 Mass.
567; Bisbing v. Asbury Park (igio) 8o N. J. L. 416, 78 Atl. ig6; Harper v.
Topeka (1914) 92 Kan. II, 139 Pac. ioi8; Bernstein v. Milwaukee (1914) i58
Wis. 576, 149 N. W. 382, (1914) i IowA L. BuLL. 102. See the notes in 33 L. M. A.
(N. s.) 523 and L. R. A. 19,5 C 435. See also ig R. C. L. 1129; (1915) 24
YALE LAw JOu NAT, 511; 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 1659; 6 McQuillin, op. cit. sec.
2678; White, op. cit., sec. ioi. See also Bolster v. Lawrence (1917) 225 Mass.
387, 114 N. E. y22, L. R. A. 1917 B 1285 (collapse of bathhouse); Hibbard v.
City of Wichita (i916) 98 Kan. 498, 159 Pac. 399; (i916) 15 Micu. L. Rnv. 18q,
(i916) 26 YALE LAW JouRNAL 77 (child bitten by animal in zoo in park).
'Denver v. Spencer (19o5) 34 Colo. 27o, 82 Pac. 590, 2 L. R. A. (N. s.) 147
and note; State v. Schweickardt (i8gi) 1o9 Mo. 496, 19 S. W. 47; Silverman v.
New York (igog, Sup. Ct. App. T.) 114 N. Y. Supp. 59; Gartland v. New York
Zoological Society (io9) 135 N. Y. App. Div. 163, 12o N. Y. Supp. 24; Pennell's
Adm'r. v. Wilmington (igo6, Del.) 7 Pen. 229, 78 Atl. 915. See Van Dyke v.
City of Utica (922, Sup. Ct. App. Div.) 196 N. Y. Supp. 277 and the cases there
discussed.
' Weber v. Harrisburg (i9o6) 216 Pa. 117, 64 Atl. 9o5; Ankenbrand v. Phila.
deiphia (913) 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 581; Ackeret v. Minneapolis (915) 129 Minn.
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others, where injuries occurred, notably to children, by falling into
improperly guarded ponds or in other ways, liability was derived on the
theory of attractive nuisances maintained by the city.
293
II
There are certain public services which only the government can
adequately perform, as for example, the administration of justice, the
preservation of public peace and enforcement of the laws, and the pro-
te6tion of the community from fire and disease. It may hence be con-
ceded that the principle of immunity for the torts of officers engaged
in "governmental" functions had some legitimate field of application.
Not that such a principle is necessarily inherent in government, for as
will be seen hereafter, not a few governments in the world assume
responsiblity for the torts of officers engaged in these functions. But
at least where there is an effort to sustain the principle, it will more
readily meet approval in respect of these public services than in many
of the other municipal activities already mentioned. Yet, except as to
police officers, it will be found that the principle is not maintained in
its pristine purity even in connection with these services, for the effort
of courts to do justice to the injured individual, notably for the torts
of firemen and health officers, has induced the courts frequently to
qualify the application of the principle on grounds which commend
themselves as more just and sound in their effect than in the reasoning
invoked in their support.
Police
With respect to the torts of police officers, there is an unusual degree
of unanimity against municipal liability. The courts are not, however,
contented with invoking the ground that police officers are performing
"governmental" functions in preserving the peace and enforcing the
law and that hence the city, on the traditional policy of the common
law, escapes liability for their nonfeasance or misfeasance, but they
usually proceed to recite the whole gamut of alleged supporting
grounds, namely, that their duties are prescribed by general law, that
39o, 151 N. W. 976, (1915) I5 COL. L. REV. 637. In Massachusetts the paths in
the parks and commons are not regarded as public highways but are deemed to be
used for pleasure, hence the cities and towns are not held liable under the statutes
respecting liability for streets and highways for permitting these paths to become
dangerous and out of repair. Clark v. Waltham (188o) .328 Mass. 567.
Barthold v. Philadelphia (1893) 154 Pa. io9, 26 AtI. 304; 4nadarko v. Swain
(1914) 42 Okla. 741, 142 Pac. 1104; Canon City v. Cox (1913) 55 Colo. 264, 133
Pac. lO4O (merry-go-round kept in unsafe condition) ; Capp v. City of St. Louis
(1913) 251 Mo. 345. 158 S. W. 616, (1914) 2 L. s. Mo. BULL. 41, 43.
See also Roullier v. Magog (igio, Que.) 37 C. S. 246. In Carey v. Kansas City
(i9o5) 187 Mo. 715, 86 S. XV. 438, the child was guilty of gross contributory
negligence in climbing a fence around a reservoir after repeated warning, and
hence plaintiff was nion-suited.
GOVERNMENT LIABILITY IN TORT
they act for the behefit of the public at large and not for the city and
its inhabitants, and that, though appointed, paid and discharged by the
city authorities, they are not agents of the city but of the state, for
which the city is acting by delegation in carrying on police functions,
and that therefore the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply.
Not many of these alleged supporting reasons commend themselves as
convincing or consequential, yet they appear in the cases with fairly
consistent regularity. It will be readily admitted that there is no
ground of tort liability of the city at common law for a mere failure
to enforce the law or suppress crime. But the immunity goes further,
extending to the most wilful, negligent or illegal acts of police officers.
Thus, the city escapes liability for false arrest, unnecessary violence
in arrest, gross negligence in shooting an innocent bystander, or mali-
ciously injuring him,--though the city knew of the officer's vicious
propensities-trespass on real estate, or similar injury to person or
property, even though the city authorities ratify the act or have them-
selves been negligent in failing to exact a bond from the officer upon
which the injured person might have sued. 294  And yet the rule is not
altogether free from exception, for several cases have sought to find
that the police officer was at the time of injury engaged in "corporate"
functions or functions in which municipal liability is more generally con-
ceded, for example, negligently failing to keep the streets safe or free
from nuisances. 29 5 "
The leading cases perhaps are Bartlett v. Columbus (1897) iOm Ga. 300, 28
S. E. 599; Whitfield v. Paris (1892) 84 Tex. 431, 19 S. W. 566; Laniont v. Sava-
naugh (ii5) 129 Minn. 321, 152 N. W. 720; Gilhor v. Salt Lake City (I9o7)
32 Utah i8o, 89 Pac. 714; Aldrich v. City of Youngstozw (1922) Io6 Ohio St.342, 14o N. E. 164. See the cases discussed in i9 R. C. L. 1119; 4 Dillon, op. cit.
see. 1656; 5 McQuillin, op. cit. sec. 2431; White, op. cit., sec. 67; 12 L. R. A.(N. s.) 537, 17 L. R. A. (N. s.) 741, L. R. A. 1915 E 460; Ann. Cas. 1913 C 471;
and 12 A. L. R. 247.
"'Jones v. Sioux City (1919) 185 Iowa 1178, 17o N. W. 445, (1919) 3 MINN.L. REv. 359 (pedestrian killed by driver of police auto engaged in hauling police-
men to their patrols in outlying districts-held a corporate function). But wherepatrol wagon injured pedestrian, it was held a "governmental" function. Aldrich
v. Youngstownt, supra. Shinnick v. Marshalltown (19o8) 137 Iowa 72, 114 N. W.542, (stretching rope across street-"corporate" duty to keep streets free from
nuisances) ; Carrington v. St. Louis (1886) 89 Mo. 208, I S. W. 240 (open doorin street leading to cellar underneath police station-same principle); Herron v.
Pittsburg (1903) 204 Pa. St. 509, 54 At. 311 (ibid.) ; see other cases cited in note
in 17 L. R. A. (x. s.) 741.
In Quebec and some other British possessions, e. g. New South Wales, police
officers act in a dual capacity, as officer of the local government and as officer of
the crown. In the former capacity, the city has been held liable in Quebec forfalse arrest, assault, and illegal detention, or where the city has ratified the illegal
act. See Laviolette v. Thomas (1881) I Montreal Super. Ct. 350; Guinette v.
Montreal (1888) 4 ibid. 69; Bourget v. Sherbrooke (i9o5 Sup'r. Ct.) 27 Rap.Jud. Quebec 78. Other Quebec cases where liability was imposed or denied are
cited in Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 472.
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Fire Department
In the case of injuries occasioned by negligent acts- of omission or
commission incidental to the maintenance and operation of a fire depart-
ment, whether due to the municipal authority as a body or to the spas-
modic acts of a fireman, there is the same practical uniformity, in the
absence of statute, in exempting the city from liability, on the ground
that in the service of protection against fire the city is engaged in a
governmental function. The customary ritual is advanced that the ser-
vice is undertaken in obedience to legislative act; that the fire depart-
ment is not maintained for the benefit of the city and its inhabitants-
the courts do not seem to realize the challengeability of this statement;
that the employees of the department, although appointed, paid and dis-
charged by the corporation are not "agents of the city" for whose con-
duct it is liable, but they act as "officers of the city"-they admit this-
charged with a public service, for whose negligence in the discharge of
official duty no action lies against the city, without express authority;
and that the maxim of respondeat superior has, "therefore," no appli-
cation. 296
That much of this reasoning is tautological and in part paradoxical
and a non sequitur has not materially weakened the judicial tenacity in
embracing it. Only lately, in the well-known Fowler case in Ohio,-
since overruled,--has a court had the temerity to overthrow the ritual
by adopting the opposite thesis that the operation of a fire engine, at
least when returning from a fire, involved a ministerial duty-possibly
an unnecessary and unsound admission. At all events, by the great
weight of authority in this country the city escapes all liability for
negligent failure to extinguish fires, whether due to an insufficient
supply of water, to the incompetence or negligence of firemen or to the
defectiveness of the apparatus; as well as for injuries to a pedestrian
or to property by the negligent driving or other negligent act of a fire-
man or the defective condition of apparatus.297 Even the voluntary
"' This language is sustantially that of Bigelow, C.J,, in Hafford v. New Bed-
ford (186o, Mass.) 16 Gray 297, and has been adopted in a great many subsequent
cases and in 4 Dillon, op. cit. 2985.
' The leading cases probably are: Van Horn v. Des Moines (1884) 63 Ia. 447,
ig N. W. 293; Wright v. Augusta (1886) 78 Ga. 241; Jewett v. New Haven
(1871) 38 Conn. 368; Burrill v. Auguata (1886) 78 Me. 118, 3 Atl. 177. But see
Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee (1922) 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697, 3o-A. L. P. 471, in
which it was held that a fire truck, so constructed and operated as to menace and
injure pedestrians on the sidewalk near corners, imposed liability on the city. The
influence of Fowler v. Cleveland, supra, is evident; and the fact that the city had a
commission form of government, "a large quasi-public corporation whose activities
partake more of the nature of a business than a government," exercised a strong
influence. See 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 166o; 5 McQuillin, op. cit. sec. 2432; White,
op. cit., sec. 66; ig R. C. L. 1116 et seq.; 15 L. R. A. 781; 4 L. R. A. (N. s.) 629;
44 L. R. A. (N. s.) 68; 18 Ann. Cas. 5o8; 9 A. L. R. 143-157; where the cases
are set out at some length.
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destruction of property to prevent the spread of a conflagration created
no liability at common law, though statutes now frequently providefor compensation. 29  The immunity is often extended to acts having
the most indirect connection with fire protection, such as the acts of a
municipal employee weighing coal for the fire department299 the
engagement of the fireman or the apparatus in drills or in parades and
celebrations, or even in flushing the streets.80 0 The judicial choice, fre-quently presented in particular cases, between imposing liability for
unsafe streets and extending immunity for acts of firemen has usuallybeen resolved in favor of the immunity.301 The conflict between theliability for insufficient hydrant service or defective water system andthe immunity for acts incidental to fire protection has not been
so uniformly decided in favor of the ity.802
White v. City Council of Charleston (1835, S. C.) 2 Hill, 571, (1884) i8AmEa. L. Rv. 1009; McDonald v. City of Red Wing (1868) 13 Minn. 38;American Print Works v. Lawrence (1847) 21 N. J. L. 248, (i85o) 23 N. J. L.590; see Aitken v. Wells River (1898) 70 Vt. 308, 40 Atl. 829; see zo R. C. L. 64;Ann. Cas. 1913 C 6oo. Recognition of the injustice of imposing such undue burdenon the individual for the benefit of the community as a whole led to the enactmentof statutes providing for compensation. 4 Dillon, op. cit. secs. 1632-1635. Seethe article by Henry C. Hall and John H. Wigmore, Compensation for PropertyDestroyed to Prevent Spread of a Conflagration (I9o7) I I. L. REv. 50l, 514,
with summary of the cases.
'z ' anske v. Milwaukee (1904) 123 Wis. 172, ioI N. W. 377 (reckless moving
of scales used in weighing coal for fire department).
'Gillespie v. Lincoln (1892) 35 Neb. 34, 52 N. W. 81i (exercising fire horses);Smith v. Rochester (1879) 76 N. Y. 5o6 (parade); O'Daly v. Louisville (i914)
,56 Ky. 815, 162 S. W. 79 (flushing street in front of fire house); contra:Bowden v. Kansas City (19o4) 69 Kan. 587, 77 Pac. 573; Simon v. Atlanta (i881)67 Ga. 618 (stretching rope across highway); cf. Shinnick v. Marshalltown(I9O8) 137 Iowa 72, 114 N. W. 542, where for the like act of a policemanliability was imposed for breach of the "corporate" duty to keep the streets freefrom nuisances. Supra note 295.
" Welsh v. Rutland (x883) 56 Vt. 228 (slipping on ice caused by thawing out ofhydrant by fireman); O'Meara v. New York (1865, N. Y. Sup. Ct) i Daly 425(driving fire engine on sidewalk) ; Dodge v. Granger (1892) i7 P- 1. 664, 24 Atl.ioo, I5 L. R. A. 781 and note (ladder truck standifig across sidewalk). In thesecases and others cited in 19 R_ C. L. 1II7-I118, note 2o, the city was held exempt,notwithstanding the fact that the fire department's acts or negligence made thestreets unsafe. But see Opocensky v. South Omaha (1917) 1o1 Neb. 336, 163N. W. 325, where exception from the statutory speed limit was extended only tofire "emergency calls," and not to other cases of excessive speed. See also Hill-strom v. St. Paul (i916) 134 Minn. 451, 159 N. W. IO76, where city was heldliable for falling of rotten pole used to carry wires for fire alarm system.See Aschoff v. Evansville (904) 34 Ind. App. 25, 72 N. E. 279 (maintenanceof water system--"corporate" liability) ; City of Winona v. Botzet (agog,C. C. A. 8th) 169 Fed. 321, 23 L. R. A. (Nr. s.) 204. Still an effort has beenmade to distinguish between the utility when used for fire service or for watersupply and to derive the appropriate conclusion as to immunity and liability respec-tively. Wright v. Augusta (z886) 78 Ga. 241; Springfield Fire & M. Ins. Co. v.Keeseville (r895) 148 N. Y. 46, 42 N. E. 405; Judson v. Winsted (I9o8) 8o Conn.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Notwithstanding the nearly uniform rule of immunity in the opera-
tion of a fire department, the Supreme Court of Ohio in the recent
Fowler case, above mentioned,303 and since overruled, struck by the
injustice done to the individual by the application of the traditional
rule, reexamined its bases and came to the conclusion that it had sur-
vived its originating conditions and its usefulness. In a decision chal-
lenging the validity of the view that the operation of a fire department
is still a governmental function, the court concluded that while the deter-
mination whether a fire department was necessary and how extensive
it should be is a discretionary and governmental act, the actual
administration of the existing system is a ministerial act, for negli-
gence in the performance of which liability is incurred. The court
thus admits the traditional classification of governmental and corporate
functions, but contracts the former practically to legislative powers
and enlarges the latter to include acts of administration. The court
challenges the classic view that the city is a repository of sovereign
powers and enjoys the state's immunity from suit and liability. It
justifies this view by pointing out the metamorphosis in the function
of the city as "a great public service corporation"--as indeed, we must
admit, is the state. The court in this connection says:
"A municipal corporation is a vastly different thing from what it
was in the early days. Then its function was very largely expressed in
the exercise, as a political subdivision, of the delegated and limited
powers of the sovereignty. It was a favorite maxim of this country
that that government is best which governs least * * * Now, the
activities and undertakings of a municipal corporation are manifold.
They reach and touch in countless directions. It seems to be utterly
unreasonable that all these activities and enterprises which are brought
384, 68 Atl. 999; Piper v. Madison (igog) 140 Wis. 31x, I22 N. W. 730. See also
Martin v. Fire Commissioners (1913) 132 La. 188, 61 So. 197; and 23 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 2o5; 9 A. L. R. 155.
As to the conflict of authority where the tort involves the negligent care of a
fire-house or station see supra p. 142. The rule of liability'on the theory of a
corporate duty to keep public property in repair has been extended to the negligent
repair of a fire alarm system by contractors. Wagner v. Portland (1902) 40 Or.
389, 67 Pac. 300. So for the negligent construction of a cistern to store water
for fire purposes. Mulcairns v. Janesville (1886) 67 Wis. 24, 29 N. W. 565.
' Fowler v. City of Cleveland (191g) Ioo Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72, 9 A. L. R.
131. The case overruled Frederick v. Columbus (1898) 58 Ohio St. 538, 51 N. E.
35, which seemed pretty strongly entrenched. The court's judgment in the Fowler
case was influenced by an Ohio constitutional amendment of 1912 which subjected
the state to suit. The Fowler case has since been overruled and the Frederick case
reinstated in Aldrich v. Youngstozen (1922) iO6 Ohio St. 342, 14o N. E. 164.
See Opocensky v. South Omaha (917) loi Neb. 336, 163 N. W. 325, which
takes the same view as to firemen's functions. See also Hesketh v. Toronto
(1898) 25 Ont. App. Rep. 449, where the liability was, however, put on the ground
that the fire service was entirely voluntary, and that the firemen were therefore
"servants" not "officers" of the city-a somewhat unconvincing distinction.
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closely home to the lives of all the people of the municipality must
still be regarded as bound up in the vague and uncertain sphere of what
is called a governmental function." The court adds that "authority
should be reconciled with justice." Justice Wanamaker in a trenchant
concurring opinion, drawing on political philosophy, concluded that
the acts of a fire department were not ministerial but governmental,
and challenged the whole doctrine of immunity for the torts of munici-pal officers by denying its basis in American political theory, which, he
said, was diametrically opposed to the autocratic theory of kingly infalli-
bility and of immunity from suit under the aegis of which the doctrine
was born. Although the Fowler case was soon overruled, it illustrates
the fact that courts often make valiant efforts to escape the fetters of
traditional doctrines which work injustice.
The soundness of the doctrine of immunity as applied to instrumen-
talities engaged in extinguishing fires had already been powerfully
challenged by the United States Supreme Court in dealing with the
liability of the city of New York for the negligent operation of one of
its fire-boats while aiding in extinguishing a fire.8 *0 In holding the
city liable, and pointing out that the local law of New York, which
followed the rule of municipal immunity, did not control the maritime
law, the Supreme Court expressly refused to concede "the correctness
of the doctrine by which a municipal corporation, as to the discharge
of 'administrative duties', is treated as having two distinct capacities,
the one private or corporate, the other governmental or sovereign, in
which latter it may inflict a direct and positive wrong upon the person
or property of a citizen without power in the courts to afford redress
for such wrong."
The importance of the decision in the Fowler case, notwithstanding
the fact that it has been overruled, as well as of the grounds on which
the decision was based, is considerable. It at once caused a reexamina-
tion of the validity of the alleged distinction between governmental
and corporate duties,0 5 leading to the general conclusion that the dis-
tinction is artificial and its operation in many instances unjust, and that
the category of governmental acts, if the distinction is to be maintained,
should be confined to strictly legislative or judicial, and should not include
administrative acts. It also demonstrates that the courts have it in
their power, by taking a more modem view of the bases of municipal
activity, to enlarge the scope of so-called corporate functions indefinitely,
" Workman v. New York (igoo) 179 U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct. 212. See alsoThompson Nov. Co. v. Chicago (1897, N. D. Ill.) 79 Fed. 984 and Henderson v.Cleveland (I8qq. E. D.. Ohio) 93 Fed. 844; and Chicago v. White Transportation
Co. (1917, C. C. A. 7th) 243 Fed. 358, aff. 245 U. S. 66o. See also supra, p. 38.
' (r92r) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL 911; (1921) 34 HARV. L. Rv. 66; (192o) 20COL. L. REV. 774; (1919) 5 CORN. L. QUART. 90. See also a valuable article byAlbert J. Harno, "Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporation," (1921) 4 ILL. L.QUART. 28.
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in accordance with the spirit of the times and a more enlightened con-
ception of social and individual jutice; for if the fire department ser-
vice can be swept into the ministerial category-perhaps "administra-
tive" would be a better term--certainly there is no reason why all
branches of the police, health and other public services not already so
classified, could not be transferred into that field of municipal
functions.
Public Health
The safeguarding of the public health is usually deemed to be a
"governmental" function, so that torts committed by health officers
do not render the city liable, in the absence of statute.306 This goes so
far as to exempt the city, although the injury occur in connection with
a service only incidentally connected with the preservation of the public
health. Thus, the defective condition of public hospitals or pesthouses
is not deemed to render the city liable ;307 nor is it where the injury
occurred by negligently exposing certain dynamite caps used in blasting
for the construction of a hospital ;308 nor where a city ambulance negli-
gently runs over a pedestrian. 0 9 The immunity is usually justified by the
Evans v. Kankakee (1907) 231 Ill. 223, 83 N. E. 223, 13 L. R. A. (N. s.)
119o, note; Nicholson v. Detroit (1902) 129 Mich. 246, 88 N. W. 695 (exposing
persons to smallpox or other contagious disease by negligence of municipal
officers); Tollefson v. Ottawa (19o7) 228 Ill. 134, 81 N. E. 823; Twyman v.
Frankfort (1904) 117 Ky. 518, 78 S. W. 446 (negligently caring for person in
hospital or pesthouse); Howard v. Philadelphia (I915) 250 Pa. St. 184, 95 Atl.
388, L. R. A. 1916 B 917, note (impure vaccine administered by city physician in
compulsory vaccination); Levin v. Burlington (19o) 129 N. C. 184, 39 S. E.
822 (negligently or erroneously quarantining a person) ; Prichard v. Morgantown
(19oo) 126 N. C. 908, 36 S. E. 353. In such cases, the officers are individually
liable. Lowe v. Conroy (1904) 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942. See 4 Dillon,
op. cit. sec. 1661; 6 McQuillin, op. cit. sec. 2669; White, op. cit. sec. 56; 19
R. C. L. U21; 4 Ann. Cas. 624; 13 L. R. A. (x. s.) 119o; and Ann. Cas. 1918 D
803.
I Butler v. Kansas City (1916) 97 Kan. 239, 155 Pac. 12, L. R. A. 1916 D 626;
Benton v. Boston City Hospital (i885) 14o Mass. 13 (injury to person entering
building on business, due to unsafe condition of stairs). Scott v. Indianapolis
(1921) 85 Ind. App. 387, 13o N. E. 658 (injury from falling into unguarded
elevator shaft in city hospital) ; White, op. cit., secs. 56, 102. See the break with
precedent in City of Shawnee v. Roush (1924, Okla.) 223 Pac. 354, in which a city
was held liable for injury sustained by paying patient in a city hospital, the
function being deemed "proprietary." (1924) 24 CoL. L. Rxv. 670.
3°'Frost v. Topeka (1916) 98 Kan. 636, 161 Pac. 936, L. P, A. 19,7 C 429.
"Maxmilian v. New York (1862) 2 Hun. 263, aff. 62 N. Y. i6o; Watson v.
Atlanta (1911) 136 Ga. 370, 71 S. E. 664; Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital
(1923) 246 Mass. 363, 141 N. E. 113. Cf. Neff v. Wellesley (1889) 148 Mass.
487, 2o N. E. i Z (cart driven by employee of poor farm). In Kellogg v. Church
Charity Foundation (1911) 2o3 N. Y. 191, 96 N. E. 4o6, the plaintiff recovered
from the charitable corporation for the negligence of its servant, an ambulance
driver. See also Murtha v. New York Homeopathic Medical College (192o) 228
N. Y. 183, 126 N. E.-722, where the hospital corporation, under contract with the
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assertion that in the preservation of the public health, the city acts as a
"quasi-sovereignty" and under the customary formula is not liable for
the acts of health officers, who, according to the theory adopted, are not
officers of the city, but officers of the state, inasmuch as they are per-
forming a governmental or state and not a corporate function. The
fact that the health service is a community service and has no more
true relation to state sovereignty than the supply of water or gas, does
not appear to have been suggested by the courts. Yet as a public service
for the benefit of the inhabitants of the city-though the traditional
theory requires this manifest fact to be denied-every consideration of
justice requires that the city assume responsibility for the torts of its
health officers. Indeed, practical considerations have induced such
a statutory change in several states. If health officers are to be made
personally liable-as they of course are-for negligence or mistake in
destroying property as a nuisance or impairing the liberty of persons
in enforcing the health laws, 10 they will be disposed to be over-
cautious, to the manifest danger of the community. Hence statutes
have occasionally placed responsibility for such mistakes on the city,"1
a policy which is to be highly commended as best satisfying the needs
of the public, the injured person and the officer, as well as the demands
of justice.
The justification for such an assumption of liability by the city for
at least the good faith mistakes and torts of its officers, is well expressed
in the opinion of the Massachusetts court in Thayer v. BostonM2 as
follows:
"There is a large class of cases, in which the rights of both the
public and of individuals may be deeply involved, in which it cannot be
known at the time of the act whether it is lawful or not. The event of
a legal inquiry, in a court of justice, may show that it was unlawful.
Still, if it was not known and understood to be unlawful at the time;
if it was an act done by the officers having competent authority, either
by express vote of the city government, or by the nature of the duties
and functions with which they are charged, by their offices, to act upon
the general subject-matter; and especially if the act was done with an
honest view to obtain for the public some lawful benefit or advantage-
reason and justice obviously require that the city, in its corporate
capacity, should be liable to make good the damage sustained by an
individual in consequence of the acts thus done. It would be equally
injutious to the individual sustaining damage, and to the agents and
city to furnish ambulances on emergency call, was held liable for negligence of a
driver of its ambulance. See also article by 0. L. McCaskill, Respondeat Superior
as Applied in New York to Quasi-Public awd Eleemosynary Institutions (92o) 5
CoRN. L. QuART. 4o9, 6 ibid. 56.
Miller v. Horton (189i) 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. ioo; Lowe v. Conroy
(904) 120 Wis. I5I, 97 N. W. 942.
m Mass. Laws of 1892, ch. 195, sec. 3; New York City Charter, Laws i9oi,
vol. 3, c. 466, sec. 1196.
Thayer v. Boston (1837) 39 Pick. 511. 3 Am. Dec. 157.
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persons employed by the city government, to leave the party injured
no means of redress except against agents employed, and by what at the
time appeared to be competent authority, to do the acts complained of,
but which are proved to be unauthorized by law."
Charitable Trusts
The doctrine of the immunity of city hospitals and similar institu-
tions has undoubtedly been greatly influenced by the doctrines devel-
oped in connection with the non-liability of charitable trusts for torts.
Judging by the irreconcilable explanations offered by the courts for
maintaining the immunity of these charitable corporations, it would seem
as if the sustaining principle is unstable and uncertain. Whether justi-
fied on the ground that it is a breach of the trust and a diversion of trust
funds to pay damages for torts,"'3 or as against public policy ;314 or on
the ground that the doctrine of respondeat superior, as in the case
of the state, does not apply to charitable corporations 315 none of the
reasons commends itself as necessarily logical or sound. Thus, we find
-several of the best considered cases confining the immunity solely to
"Heriot's Hospital Peoffees v. Ross (1846, H. L.) 12 Cl. & F. 507. This
doctrine is no longer maintained in England. Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospi-
tal [1919] 2 K. B. 82o, and in Canada, Lavere v. Smith's Falls Public Hospital
(1915) 35 Ontario L. Rep. 98, though it still finds some support in the United
States. It has been extended to private. charitable trusts, Parks v. Northwestern
University (1905) 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 99'; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis
(191o) 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. lO87. But in Love v. Nashville Agricultural and
Normal Institute (1922) 146 Tenn. 550, 243 S. W. 304 damages were recovered
for a sewage nuisance. See (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 748; Roosen v. Peter Brigham
Hospital (3920) 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392; and the articles of Prof. McCaskill,
supra, (1920) 5 COR. L. QUART. 409, 6 ibid. 56.
"McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital (1876) 120 Mass. 432; Hearns v.
Waterbury Hospital (1895) 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595; Magnuson v. Swedish
Hospital (3938) 99 Wash. 399, 369 Pac. 828. See Elmer M. Dax, Immunity of
Charitable Institutions from Liability (3923) 6 ST. Louis L. REV. 226, 229,
note 8; and (1912) 25 HARV. L. REv. 723, note 4. In Basabo v. Salvation Army
(1912) 35 R. I. 22, 85 At. 120, holding the charity liable in tort, the defense of
public policy was condemned. In Massachusetts the doctrine of public policy was
developed out of the theory that hospitals were governmental agencies. Benton v.
Boston City Hospital (1885) 140 Mass. 13, r N. E. 836. See also Morrison v.
Henke (1911) 165 Wis. I66, i6o N. W. 172.
""Holliday v. St. Leonard (1861, C. P.) i C. B. N. S 192; this case was over-
ruled in Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury (871, Q. B.) L. R. 6 Q. B. 214. The
doctrine has, however, been adopted in the United.States in the same illogical way
that it has been applied to the State and so-called state agencies and cities plrform-
ing alleged "governmental" functions. Loefler v. Trustees of S'eppard . ..
Hospital (917) 130 Md. 265, Ioo Atl. 3O; Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospi'al,
supra, note 309. See the criticism of the doctrine in (1912) 25 HARV. L. Rrv. 721,
iote ii; and in (I938) 31 HARV. L. REV. 479. See also Bachmann v. Y. W. C A.
(1922) 179 Wis. 178, 191 N. W. 751, criticized as going too far, in (1913) 23.
MIcH. L. REv. 698, and annotated in 3o A. L. R. 455. See cases reviewed in 14
A. L. R. 572 and 23 A. L. R. 923.
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charitable beneficiaries of the trust, but not to third persons,3 16 or deny-
ing the immunity altogether.117  These cases commend themselves as
sound from the points of view of public policy, the injured individual
and the charitable corporation itself, for responsibility for fault induces
care in administration. But whatever justification the doctrine of
immunity may have in respect of ordinary charitable trusts-and it is
submitted that it has'very little,3 14-none of the reasons prevail when
the institution is owned or operated by the city, which has the taxing
power to secure funds for the vindication of its responsibility for
negligence and is therefore in no danger of having its existence sud-
denly terminated. Nothing better illustrates the artificiality and the
injustice of permitting the municipal community through its appointed
agents promiscuously to injure private individuals without responsi-
bility.
The influence exercised upon the courts by the idea of the sanctity
of private property has brought about some conflict where injury to
private property was occasioned by the establishment, even in the
absence of negligence, of a pest-house or hospital for contagious
diseases so close to private property as to constitute a nuisance. Where
the idea of protection of private property dominated, the city was held
"Hordern v. Salvation Army (i9iO) I99 N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626; Kellogg v.
Church Charity Foundation (IgI) 203 N. Y. i9i, 96 N. E. 406. Schloendorff v.
N. Y. Hospital (1914) 2II N. Y. 125, 129, io5 N. E. 92; Hewett v. Woman's
Hosp. Aid Asso. (i9o6) 73 N. H. 556, 64 Atl. i9o; Bruce v. Central M. E. Church
(1907) 147 Mich. 230, iio N. W. 95i; Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hospital Asso.
(1918) IO2 Neb. 343, I67 N. W. 2o8; and Tucker z?. Mobile Infirmary Ass&
(915) 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, L. R. A. I915 D 1167, in which the doctrine of
immunity in tort is challenged in principle; approved in City of Shawnee s.
Roush (1924, Okla.) 223 Pac. 354.
" Glavin v. Rhode Island (879) 12 R. I. 411; Tucker v. Mobile Infirinary
Asso. (1915) 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4. Some cases make the criterion of immunity
for negligence the care of the corporation in selecting its agents. Powers v. Mass.
Homeopathic Hospital (IgoI, C. C. A. Ist) IO9 Fed. 294; Nicholson v. Hospi-
tal Asso. (1916) 97 Kan. 480, I55 Pac. 92o; McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hospital
(1876) 120 Mass. 432.
Rhode Island passed a statute exempting charitable corporations from liability
to patients for the negligence of their servants. R. I. Gen. Laws I9O9, c. 213,
sec. 38.
Where the corporation is not charitable, but conducted for profit, there is no
reason to limit its liability. Phillips v. St. Louis and San Francisco R. R. Co.
(1907) 211 Mo. 419, III S. W. 1o9. But the mere receipt of some compensation
from patients does not deprive it of its charitable character. Gable v. Sisters of
St. Francis (1910) 227 Pa. 254 75 Ati. io87; Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital Asso.
(1918, C. C. A. 3d) 247 Fed. 639. In New York. the immUnity with respect to
beneficiories is extended to institutions of a quasi-penal character. Corbett v.
St. Vincent's Industrial School (i9o3) I77 N. Y. x6, 68 N. E. 997. This is on the
theory of impl'ed waiver, an unconvincing extension of the fiction of waiver when
applied to a person compelled by judicial decree to enter a reformatory, a penal
institution.
"' See the argument in (3918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 479.
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liable ;319 where the governmental character of the municipal function
dominated, the city or board of health was held immune.3 2 0  The con-
flict is irreconcilable, and challenges the validity of the operative
principle.
Removal of Refuse
The removal of garbage, refuse, rubbish and ashes from the streets
or from residences along the streets is deemed by the majority of the
courts to be incidental to the protection of the public health and hence
to constitute a "governmental" function. Thus, we find the somewhat
startling proposition sustained that the driver of a city ash cart or gar-
bage wagon is engaged in the sovereign governmental work of safeguard-
ing the public health, for whose torts the city cannot be liable because he
is the agent of the "public," not of the city, and that hence the doctrine
of respondeat superior does not apply.32 1 This rule of immunity has
even been applied where the city recouped some of the expense of col-
lecting garbage by selling it at the incinerator.32
2
On the other hand, several courts have confessed their inability to
stretch the imagination thus far or else have had a better sense of
humor or justice and have held the city liable for the torts of menial
servants of the type in question either on the ground that removing
'Haag v. Vanderburgh County (1878) 6o Ind. 511; but see Clayton v. Hender-
son (1898) IO3 Ky. 228, 44 S. W. 667, where a statute forbade establishment of
pesthouse within mile of city, but only made the officers, not the city, liable. See
also Henderson v. O'Haloran (I902) 114 Ky. 186, 70 S. W. 662. See also Balti-
more v. Fairfield Improv. Co. (1898) 87 Md. 352, 39 Atl. io8i; Thompson v. Kim-
brough (19OO) 23 Tex. Civ. App. 350, 57 S. W. 328 (injunction against nuisance);
White, op. cit., sec. 117.
'Arnold v. Stanford (29o2) 113 Ky. 852, 69 S. W. 726, decided by the same
court that decided Clayton v. Henderson, supra; Frazer v. Chicago (igoo) 86
Ill. 480, 57 N. E. 1O55; Barry v. Smith (19o6) 191 Mass. 78, 77 N. E. iogg,
5 L. R. A. (N. s.) lO28 and note.
' Collecting garbage and ashes: Louisville v. Heheinann (914) I61 Ky. 523,
171 S. W. 165; Love v. Atlanta (1894) 95 Ga. I29, 22 S. E. 29 (negligent running
away of mule drawing garbage cart) ; Savannah v. Jordan (914) 142 Ga. 409, 83
S. E. 2O9; Condict v. Jersey City (1884) 46 N. J. L. 157; James v. Charlatte
(1922) 183 N. C. 630, 112 S. E. 423; Behrmann v. St. Louis (19,8) 273 Mo. 578,
201 S. W. 547; Scibilia v. Philadelphia (924) 279 Pa. 549, 124 N. E. 273, (1924)
72 PA. L. REV. 452; Haley v. Boston (i9o6) 191 Mass. 291, 77 N. E. 888. To the
effect that the majority of the courts hold that flushing or sprinkling the streets
is governmental rather than corporate, see supra note 276. See the metaphysical
refinements indulged in by the court in Akron.v. Butler (1923) io8 Ohio St. 122,
14o N. E. 324, in determining whether the driver of a truck under the supervision
of the superintendent of street cleaning, while returning from the railroad depot
after delivering a package for shipment, was engaged in a function related to
street cleaning, hence governmental, or in a proprietary function.
'Manning v. City of Pasadena (1922) 58 Cal. App. 666, 209 Pac. 253; citing
as authority, erroneously, it is believed, cases involving state harbor commissioners,
Chapman v. State (894) 1O4 Calif. 690, 38 Pac. 457; Denning v. State (2899)
123 Calif. 316, 55 Pac. 1ooo.
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such refuse is simply corporate and not governmental in character, 2 3
or that it involves a duty incidental to the care and safety of the public
streets and is for that special reason corporate, or that the city acts in
place of the private owners in removing a private nuisance.3 24
The negligent failure to remove garbage cans from the streets has
produced a similar conflict of views as to the predominance of the ele-
ment of public health over the element of obstructing the streets .25 Yet,
where the work of removing garbage results in the establishment of
a nuisance, especially injurious to adjoining private property, the con-
sideration of injury to private property prevails over that of the
governmental nature of the municipal function, and the city has
usually been held liable.12 6  But where the dumping ground or
other nuisance merely causes injury to the person, by the offensiveness
of odors or in other ways, the "governmental" immunity of the city
reasserts itself. So that where the nuisance simultaneously causes
sickness to the person and injury to the property, the owner may recover
damages for the diminished value of the property, sickness being evi-
dence of diminished power -of enjoyment and value; but for the sick-
ness itself, it seems, no recovery is allowed,3 27 though the wrongfulness
=' The courts are bound by no special inhibitions, except previous decisions, in
classifying a particular function as governmental or corporate. Pass Christian v.
Fernandez (igii) ioo Miss. 76, 56 So. 329; Young v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.
(1907) 126 Mo. App. i, io3 S. W. 135. See 5 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1005; 6 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 1013; 39 L. R. A. (N. s.) 649; 14 A. L. R. 1473; 4 Dillon, op. cit. see.
1662; 6 McQuillin, op. cit. sec. 2636.
"'Missano v. New York (i899) i6o N. Y. 223, 54 N. E. 744. Quill v. New
York (I899) 36 App. Div. 476, 55 N. Y. Supp. 889. The New York courts seem
more practical in their views in such matters than the courts of many other states.
See also Barney Dumping Boat Co. v. New York (1889, S. D. N. Y.) 40 Fed. 5o.
"'Savannah v. Jordan (1924) i42 Ga. 4o9, 83 S. E. Iog (immune as incidental
to the preservation of public health) ; Louisville v. Hans (i9,5) 167 Ky. i6o, i8o
S. W. 65 (liable for obstructing the streets).
" Stephenville v. Bowen (1902) 29 Tex. Civ. App. 384, 68 S. W. 833; Flanna-
gan v. Bloomington (igio) I56 Ill. App. 162; Louisville v. Hehenmnn (1914)
i6i Ky. 523, 17I S. W. I65; Georgetown v. Amnerman (i91) 143 Ky. 209, 136
S. W. 2o2 (the element of eminent domain arising out of damage to private
property being an important consideration); Denver v. Davis (i9o6) 37 Colo.
370, 86 Pac. io27; Denver v. Porter (i9o3, C. C. A., 8th) 226 Fed. 288; .,ew
Albany v. Slider (1899) 22 Ind. App. 392, 52 N. E. 626. See also 43 L. R. A.
(N. s.) I037. So with respect to trespass on private property, Ostrom v.
San Antonio (ioi) 94 Tex. 523, 62 S. W. 9o9; San Antonio v. Mackey (i896)
14 Tex. Civ. App. 220, 36 S. W. 76o; (i899) 22 Tex. Civ. App. 245, 54 S. W. 33.
But in a Massachusetts case, carefully considered, even the flooding of a cellar
caused by the dumping of ashes into a water-course was deemed not to render the
city liable. Johnson v. Somerville (29o7) 295 Mass. 370, 8i N. E. 268.
' Williams v. Town of Greenville (i9o2) 13o N. C. 93, 40 S. E. 977; Hines v.
Rocky Mount (1913) i62 N. C. 409, 78 S. E. 51o, L. R. A. 1915 C 751. In the
latter case, the court said: "In affording damages for wrongs of this character,
injuries caused by a nuisance wrongfully created in the exercise of governmental
functions, our decisions hold as the correct deduction from the above principle
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of the act is admitted in the fact that an individual -suffering from the
offensive odors created may obtain an injunction restraining the nui-
sance.32 8 Such artificial and unsound distinctions, sustained largely
because of an alleged fear of multiplicity of suits against the city, have
been vigorously denounced on numerous occasions, 329 and serve to indi-
cate the urgent need for a reexamination of the principles on which
community liability for torts may properly be founded.
III
Public Utilities
The expansion in the functions of a municipality in all civilized
countries has resulted in the assumption, whether by legislative command
or by permission, of many duties formerly performed solely by- private
persons. Among these the most common are the duties of public service
usually identified with the supply of water, light, gas, transportation and
similar undertakings. These services, known under the generic name
of public utilities, are generally rendered for compensation, though not
necessarily for profit. In determining the liability of the municipality
for the torts of its agents in the conduct of these enterprises, the courts
find little difficulty in apprehending the corporate nature of the service,
the element of compensation, though not always directly apparent,
affording the most common operative fact taking these services out of
that the damages are confined to the diminished value of the property affected, and
that sickness attributable to such nuisance may not be properly considered as a
direct element of damage."
In New Albany v. Slider (1899) 21 Ind. App. 392, 52 N. E. 626, a statute
declared that an actionable nuisance included injury to the person, so that sickness
was included.
Shreck v. Coeur d'Alene (Igo6) 12 Idaho, 708, .87 Pac. iooi; Hill v
New York (1893) 139 N. Y. 495, 34 N. E. iogo.
' See the strong dissenting opinions of Walker, J. and Allen, J. in Hines v.
Rocky Mount (913) 162 N. C. 409, 78 S. E. Sio, citing many cases in which it
has been held that municipalities are liable for nuisances like private persons, and
that injury to the person is not excluded as a ground of liability. Ste Harper v.
Milwaukee (872) 30 Wis. 365; and Williams, W. L., Liability of Municipal
Corporations for Tort (Boston, i9oi) p. 305. The fact that cities have been held
liable for personal injuries resulting from nuisances in the public streets and high-
ways is of course well established. But sickness alone, alleged to have resulted
from a ci~y's permitting water to pond in a highway, was held not to be within the
statute giving a right of action to any person who shall receive bodily injury or
damage in his person or property through a defect in the street. Triplett v. City
of Co'umbus (I918) III S. C. 7 96 S. E. 675. The majority of the court in Hines
v. Rocky Mount, supra, intimated that there was a distinction in such liability
depending upon whether the nuisance arose incidentally to corporate or govern-
mental functions. This is hardly sustainable as to injuries to property and has
no better foundation with respect to injuries to the person.
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the sphere of "governmental" enterprises."' If it were more com-
monly appreciated by the courts that the tax-payer pays for all muni-
cipal enterprises and that they must all be legally justified as accruing
to his benefit, we might find a greater disposition to drop the uncertain
and largely outworn distinction between governmental and corporate
enterprises, which has plagued the courts in a futile effort at uniform
classification and has challenged the logic of the law and the justice
of its administration. Probably a further illustration of this artificiality
of distinction may be found in the rules developed in connection with
the operation of municipal waterworks. This has now become a com-
mon field of municipal enterprise.
For the negligent failure to supply water, causing special damage to
an individual-the function having been regularly undertaken-it
would seem not unfair to hold the community liable. But here dis-
tinctions are drawn. If the failure resulted in a fire loss, which due
care might have averted, there is no community liability,. on the alleged
ground that the duty was in this case owing to the public and not to
the individual injured, notwithstanding the fact that he may have paid
water rates for the very purpose of securing this supply of water.
331
Supply of electric light, Posey v. North Birmingham (igo7) 154 Ala. 511. 45
So. 663, 15 L. R. A. (N. s.) 71i; Eaton v. Weiser (1go6) 12 Idaho 544. 86 Pac.
541. Of course, the city must have authority to operate an electric light plant.
Posey v. Birmingham, supra.
Supply of gas, Brantinan v. Canby (1912) 11 Minn. 396, 138 N. W. 671.
Contra: Irvine v. Greenwood (1911) 89 S. C. 511. 72 S. E. 228. 6 McQullin,
op. cit. sec. 2680; 3 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 1303; 4 ibid, sec. 167o; ig R. C. L. ir32
and cases there cited, note i.
Distinctions have been made by some courts where the lighting was furnished
to a public building, or on the streets, where the purpose is to prevent crime. In
doing these things, the duty was deemed "governmental" and the city immune in
tort. Hodgins v. Bay City (i9o9) 156 Mich. 687, 121 N. W. 274; Palest~ne v.
Siler (907) 225 Ill. 630, 8o N. E. 345. But in the matter of street lights, the
municipal advantage in escaping liability for street injuries has served to induce
several courts to impose liability for negligent management thereof. Sau'man v.
Nashville (1915) 131 Tenn. 427, 175 S. W. 532, L. R. A. 1915 E 336 and note;
municipal ferry, Davies v. Boston (19o6) i9o Mass. 194; 76 N. E. 663. See also
White, op. cit., secs. 85-93.
' Wright v. Augusta (1886) 78 Ga. 241; Edgerly v Concord (1879) 59 N. H.
78; Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Keeseville (1895) 148 N. Y. 46, 57, 42
N. E. 405, where the court was forced into the position of asserting that the
establishment and operation of waterworks was a "governmental" funct'on. See
3 Dillon, op. cit. sec. i3o3 1340; 4 ibid. sec. 167o; 6 McQuillin, op. cit. sec. 2680;
39 R. C. L. 1130; White, op. cit.. sec. 86; Jones, op. cit., sec. 40.
This immunity has even been extended in most, states 'to a water company
furnishing water to the city and its inhabitants under contract with the city.
German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Home Water Supply Co. (1912) 226 U. S. 220,
33 Sup. Ct. 32, overruling dicta in Guardian Trust Co. v. Fisher (1905) 2Co U. S.
57, 26 Sup. Ct. i8o. See (191o) 58 U. PA. L. REv 556 and 61 ibid. 407. This is
justified on the absence of privity of contract, disability of a th:rd party beneficiary,
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Yet when the municipal negligence results in injury of a different kind,
there seems little judicial hesitation in regarding the supply of water
as a corporate or commercial enterprise, though it is admitted that the
object in undertaking the service was not to make money but to increase
the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants and incidentally to pro-
mote the public health.3 2  When the waterworks or appurtenances,
such as hydrants, are used for the dual purposes of fire protection and
other purposes, such as flushing the streets, a valiant attempt is made
to distinguish the particular function or use in connection with which
the injury occurred and to determine liability accordingly.33
For the furnishing of contaminated or impure water it would seem
that the city can only be held liable on evidence of gross negligence
in permitting the contamination to occur.3 3 ' Though it has 'been
decided that the supply of water was not merely a service but a sale,
it seems that there is no implied warranty of purity.3 3 5
The fact that in principle the courts admit that negligence in the
operation of public utilities involves legal liability in accordance with
usual rules of law affords ground for the hope that progress may be.
made by showing that the conception of "public utilities" may properly
be enlarged to include other public services, such as the administration
of the fire and health departments. On the continent, this development
is discoverable in the enlargement of the conception of "administrative"
as distinguished from "governmental" or "sovereign" services. It is
believed that public opinion in the United States will readily support a
similar broadening of the concept of "administration" as distinguished
from "legislation" and the application of the rules of respondeat supe-
rior to functions falling within the former group.
or denial that the individual consumer is a beneficiary. But a contrary view is
taken in Kentucky, North Carolina, Florida, Wisconsin, and Indiana (semdble).
See cases cited in 3 Dillon, op. cit., p. 2304 and (1913) 61 U. PA. L. R-v. 408;
and Highway Trailer Co. v. Janesville Electric Co. (1922) 178 Wis. 340, 190
N. W. iio; (i9o6) 20 HARV. L. REv. 242; (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOuRNAL 410.
' Watson v. Needham (1894) I6I Mass. 404, 37 N. E. 2o4 (negligent failure to
supply water); Henry v. Lincoln (1913) 93 Neb. 331, 14o N. W. 664 (injury to
city employee at pumping station) ; Esberg Cigar Co. v. Portland (1899) 34 Ore.
282, 55 Pac. 961 (injury to property from bursting main). See the many other
cases cited in 39 P. C. L. 113o, note 12, and those discussed in 23 L. R. A. (N. s.)
204.
W inona v. Botzet (igo9, C. C. A. 8th) 169 Fed. 321, 23 L. R. A. (N. s.)
204 (horse frightened by whistle of waterworks) ; Judson v. Winsted (igo8) 8o
Conn. 384, 68 Atl. 999 (horse frightened by flushing of hydrant) ; 6 McQuillin,
op. cit. sec. 2683.
"Stubbs v. Rochester (1919) 2"26 N. Y.'516, 124 N. E. 137; Keever v. City of
Mankato (191o) 113 Minn. 55, x29 N. W. 358; 6 McQuillin, op. cit. sec. 2684.
See the exhaustive notes in 5 A. L. R. 1402 and (igio) i Negligence and Compen-
sation Cases 187. The cases turn largely on the question of evidence of negligence.
Canavan v. City of Mechanicsville (1920) 229 N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 882, 13
A. L. R. 1123; see (192o) 2o CoL.. L. REv. 62o, on the decision below. See dissent-
ing opinions of Pound and Elkins, JJ.
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ULTRA VIRES
One of the most uncertain departments of the law of municipal cor-
porations lies in the application of the principles of agency to the acts
of its officers. It has already been observed that the doctrine of respon-
deat superior has received an extraordinary application, relieving the
city from liability where the tort is committed in connection with so-
called "governmental" acts on the ground that in the performance of
such acts the officer is an agent of the public or state and not of the
city-a principle believed to be thoroughly unsound. Probably more
sound, but difficult of application, is the doctrine of ultra vires as
related to municipal corporations. Applied with much greater strict-
ness than in the case of private corporations, .it serves to relieve the
city from liability where the function in connection with which the
tort occurred was entirely beyond its powers, express or implied, to
undertake.838 Much stress is laid upon the degree of disability, and
it is not always easy to distinguish between a tota Lwant of power
to engage in the enterprise, in which case there is immunity, and
unlawful minor acts within a general corporate power, in which case
liability is more usual.3 3 7  Thus, it often becomes necessary to deter-
mine whether a particular act of an officer is within the scope of his
powers and of the city's general powers. Unless discrimination is used,
it might be possible to describe every unlawful or malicious act of an
officer as unauthorized and therefore ultra vires. Hence the courts
have sought to draw a line between acts entirely beyond municipal
powers and other unlawful acts, for which, if not immune on another
ground, such as their governmental character, liability is imposed; and
between official acts within the scope of the officer's powers, though
perhaps unauthorized, and personal acts entirely outside his authority-
in which latter case there is only personal liability. .38 A decision
'Disability to grant certain franchises, Idaho Springs v. Filtean (1889) io
Colo. 104,.14 Pac. 49; disability to operate a lighting plant, Posey v. North Bir-
mingham (19o7) '54 Ala. 511, 45 So. 663; to operate a ferry, Hoggard v. Monroe
(1899) 51 La. Ann. 683, 25 So. 349; to operate a quarry, Radf6rd v. Clark (1912)
113 Va. 199, 73 S. E. 571; (1912) 25 HARv. L. REv. 648.
Town held immune for unlawful criminal prosecution resulting li driving plain-
tiff from town, as ultra vires. Brown v. Edgartowrn (192o) 236 Mass. 258, 128
N. E. 1, (1922) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL 303.
The doctrine has been applied to the negligent construction of a bridge under an
unconstitutional statute. Albany v. Cunliff (1849) 2 N. Y. 165, 172,. 178.
See other illustrative cases in 4 Dillon, op cit., sec. i65o; and White, op. cit.,
secs. 33-36.
'Scott v. Tampa (I9XI) 62 Fla. 275, 55 So. 983; Worley v. Columbia (1885)
88 Mo. io6; McQuillin, op. cit. sec. 2638; White, op. cit., sec. 35.
1 Maliciously suing out an injunction, Doyle v. Sandpoint (igio) 18 Idaho 654,
112 Pac. 204; cf. Ysleta v. Babbitt (1894) 8 Tex. Civ. App. 432, 28 S. W. 702.
In Stanley v. Sangerville (i92o) iig Me. 26, 1O9 At. 189, 9 A. L. P- 348, a town
was held liable in an action for libel on the ground that it was acting in its corpor-
ate capacity when it charged the plaintiff with larceny for the alleged conversion
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of the United States Supreme Court in 1885 holding the city liable for
the torts of its officers though engaged in an enterprise ultra vires,33 9
though followed to some extent by the courts of Iowa340 and heartily
approved by Jones in his work on the Negligence of Municipal Corpora-
tions,3 41 has on the whole been repudiated judicially and is disapproved
by Dillon.3 42 It cannot be denied that there is much reason in support of
the principle that a community is liable when it has, though without
statutory power, purported to authorize a certain enterprise or act,
in the conduct or performance of which an innocent person was unlaw-
fully injured. The community, not the innocent individual, should
bear the burden of its error in exceeding its granted powers. On the
other hand, one may support the distinction between official and personal
acts of an officer, a distinction recognized in most systems of law.
MOB VIOLENCE
Finally, mention may be made of a legal institution which evidences
the fact that the Anglo-American law is not impervious to considera-
tions of social justice in imposing upon the community the risk and
burden of certain types of loss or injury falling upon innocent indi-
viduals. Reference is made to the liability imposed by statute upon
cities, towns or counties for losses suffered by individuals due to mob
violence. The institution has a long history in England, and even
longer on the European continent; in England, "the hundred" was held
answerable for robberies committed within it, and a series of statutes,
of a municipal culvert. Cf. Howland v. Maynard (893) 159 Mass. 434, 34 N. E.
515, where the city was held immune for libel where the libel was contained in a
committee report submitted to the town meeting. See also Covington County v.
Stevens (igig, C. C. A., 5th) 256 Fed. 328, holding that a county cannot commit
or authorize an officer to commit libel. In England, municipal liability appears to
depend upon whether the officer was acting within the scope of his employment.
Glasgow v Lorimer [1911, H. L.] A. C. 2o9.
Cf. Wallace v. Menasha (1880) 48 Wis. 79, 4 N. W. ioi, city held not liable
for act of city treasurer in selling property of wrong person to secure payment of
delinquent taxes; and Durkee v. Kenosha (1883) 59 Wis. 123, 17 N. W. 677,
where the city was held liable for property seized and sold under a void special
assessment in opening a street. See 4 Dillon, op. cit., secs. 1652, 1653.
Salt Lake City v. Hollister (1885) 118 U. S. 256, 6 Sup..Ct. 2055.
" Ultra vires held no defense, Fitzgerald v. Sharon (igog) 143 Ia. 73o, 12
N. W. 523. See 6 McQuillin, op. cit., sec. 2637. It seems that it is no defense in
admiralty. The Major Reybold (igoi, E. D. Pa.) ini Fed. 414.
'Jones, op. cit., p. 34r et seq. Justice Miller in Salt Lake City v. Hollister,
supra note 339, pointed out a distinction between contracts ultra ires and torts
ultra ires, imposing liability in the second case, but not in the first. The distinc-
tion has been challenged by Dillon, op. cit., v. IV, sec. 1649.
'See Cavanaugh v. Boston (1885) I39 Mass. 426, i N. E. 834, and the many
cases cited by McQuillin, 6 op. cit. sec. 2637 et seq.; 4 Dillon, op. cit. sec. 1647
et seq.; 29 R. C. L. I137; (192) 25 HARv. L. R1v. 648.
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beginning in 1285, in the statute of Westminster, 13 Edw. I, c. I, and
continued in several Riot Acts, recognized the principle that the civil
subdivision, charged with the duty of protecting property, was liable
to the individual for failure to exert the necessary power to prevent
loss, not merely by way of negligence, but absolutely.343
The institution did not come to America with the common law344 and
unless provided for by statute, failure to enforce the laws or prevent
riots or damage to property would merely be regarded as a defect in
or breach of a "governmental" duty-policy-which entails no pecuni-
ary liability. Considerations of public policy have, however, induced
a number of states to enact statutes, as have practically all the coun-
tries of Europe, imposing upon the city, town or county the duty to
indemnify, in whole or in part, the property loss sustained by the vic-
tims of mob violence.34 5
The theory and policy of such statutes have been expressed as
follows :346
"The policy. . . may be supposed to be to make good, at the public
expense, the losses of those who may be so unfortunate as, without
their own fault, to be injured in their property by acts of lawless
violence of a particular kind which it is the general duty of the govern-
ment to prevent; and further, and principally we may, suppose, to make
it the interest of every person liable to contribute to the public expenses
to discourage lawlessness and violence, and maintain the empire of the
laws established to preserve public quiet and social order. These ends
are plainly within the purview of civil government, and indeed, it is
to attain them that governments are instituted, and the means pro-
vided by this act seem to be reasonably adapted to the purposes in view."
The function of the statutes then is minatory, to induce, by realiza-
tion of community loss, a community interest in the prevention of mob
violence; preventive, in imposing responsibility for failure to prevent;
and compensatory, in imposing liability without fault and indemnity
without proof of negligence.
'Pollock & Maitland, History of,English Law, I, 545; Maitland. Collected
Papers, (19I1) vol. i, p. 230. Ratcliffe v. Eden (1776, K. B.) 2 Cowp. 485;
(875) 4 LAW MAG. & REv. 552; Chicago v. Sturges (911) 222 U. S. 313,
323, 32 Sup. Ct. 92.
'"Gianfortone v. New Orleans (1894, E. D. La.) 61 Fed. 64; Campbell v.
Montgonmery (1875) 53 Ala. 527; Western College v. Cleveland (i86i) 12 Ohio
St. 375.
... Such statutes exist in California, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and in other states. See
Dillon, 5th ed., sec. 1637-1638; White, op. cit., sec. 4i; Darlington v. New York
(1865) 31 N. Y. 164; Underhill v. Manchester (3864) 45 N. H. 214; Butte
Miners' Union v. Butte (1920) 58 Mont. 391, 394 Pac. 149, 13 A. L. R. 746, and
cases cited in 13 A. L. R. 753.
'Darlington v. New York (1865) 3 N. Y. 164. Statutes of this kind have
been held constitutional as an appropriate exercise of the police power. Chicago
v. Sturges (igii) supra, note 343.
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THESIS
Surely a community that has the social vision to charge upon itself
the full risk of a defective administration of its police protective ser-
vice in certain flagrant cases, even to the point of insurance and liability
without fault, cannot be wanting in the necessary social sense to assume
responsibility for the wrongful, illegal and tortious official acts of its
own agents inflicting loss upon individual members of the community
or strangers. Whether we reach this conclusi6n upon a theory of
respondeat superior or upon a theory of community assumption and
distribution of risk for accidents and negligence in the public service,
we should not be perverse in insisting upon our defective social engineer-
ing in the face of the experience of most other civilized countries. A
community that has been able to appreciate the sound public policy and
efficiency of workmen's compensation legislation, should not fail to meet
the more modest requirements of the universally accepted and elemen-
tary principle of the employer's responsibility for the torts of his ser-
vants within the scope of their duties or authority. That these are
public servants and the employing corporation the community itself
should make no 'difference. The officer will not be relieved from
liability to the community for wilful wrongs, but the individual victim
will no longer seek his compensation solely at the hands of a subordi-
nate officer. The community will gain by promoting respect among
its members for its fairness and justice and, instead of relying upon
antiquated formulas to escape liability, it will meet the exigencies of
modern organized life by discharging what the rest of the world recog-
nizes as just obligations.
In the second part of this study, it is proposed to examine the theories
upon which has been justified or denied the responsibility of the politi-
cal community to the individual for the torts of its agents and officers.
This will be followed by an examination of the history of the
doctrine in practice and of the positive law governing the sub-
ject in foreign countries as compared with our own. Finally, the draft
of a statute will be essayed to furnish the basis of an amendment of the
Federal Tucker Act and of the law in the various states by uniform
act.*
* The second part of this study will appear in (1925-1926) 35 YALE LAW
JOURNAL.
